- House Oversight Subcommittee Testimony on Marginal Tax Rates (February 2013):
- The ARRA: Some Unpleasant Welfare Arithmetic (Feb 2013)
- Why did Wages Rise and then Fall? (Oct 2012)
- Recent Marginal Labor Income Tax Changes by Skill and Marital Status (Sept 2012)
- Labor-market Scars Left by Redistributive Public Policy (Sept 2012)
- House Budget Committee Testimony on Marginal Tax Rates (April 2012):
- Simple Analytics and Empirics of the Government Spending Multiplier and Other "Keynesian" Paradoxes (June 2011)
- Does Labor Supply Matter during a Recession? Evidence from the Seasonal Cycle (June 2011)
- Means-tested Mortgage Modification: Homes Saved or Income Destroyed? (August 2009)
- A Depressing Scenario: Mortgage Debt Becomes Unemployment Insurance (November 2008)
- Don't Forgive that Way! (December 2008)
- Public Policies as Specification Errors (Oct 2005)
When unemployed people make more than they did on their prior job, or more more than they would by accepting a new job, economists agree that economic policy has gone wrong and is depressing the labor market. This paper estimates the numbers of people in those situations in 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (a.k.a., stimulus), and shows how the number would have been different without the stimulus, or with a bigger stimulus.
Wages are another economic statistic that has been misinterpreted, due to a failure to consider marginal tax rates. Labor and macroeconomic analyses are far from complete until they recognize the fact that after-tax real wages fell 12+ percent in less than two years.
Follow up on the marginal tax rate parts of chapter 6, but focused on just two demographics -- skill and marital status -- and public finance measurement issues. For readers of The Redistribution Recession, the highlights are Figure 7 (showing how many demographic groups' incentives were affected less by extended UI and more by the rest of the safety net) and Figure 9 (showing a miraculous positive cross-group correlation between incentive changes and work hours changes).
Blog version of the aforementioned Figure 9.
Dynamic version of Chapter 7. You or your institution will need a subscription to the journal.
An expanded version of the seasonal parts of Chapter 8.
Related to chapter 9; shows that private sector mortgage modification would have positive marginal tax rates, but not exceeding 100 percent.
An early paper showing the massive marginal tax rates created by the housing cycle.
Chicago Tribune oped about the massive marginal tax rates created by the housing cycle.
Your model doesn't fit? Maybe it's because you forgot to consider taxes and subsidies.